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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Stedman1 2 has indicated that there are four administrative alternatives,
the selection of one of which should depend on the individual circum-
stances: (1) general freedom of the public to use with no restrictions;
(2) use of the patent rights as a bargaining weapon in getting valuable
concessions from others; (3) grant of nonexclusive licenses at a reason-
able royalty; and (4) grant of exclusive or partially-exclusive licenses to
encourage the exploitation of inventions which might not otherwise be
developed. Will the government adopt any of the foregoing alternatives
as policy? If so, when and in what form will this implementation take
place? These questions are raised in the wake of the Tektronix case, but
remain to be answered in the future.
James E. Gilchrist
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: EVIDENCE SECURED UNDER
POLICE POWER WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT
ADMISSIBLE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Acting under statutory authority1 the fire chief, his employees, and
other investigators entered defendant's premises to determine the cause
and origin of a fire. The investigation continued over a period of several
weeks and a grand jury indictment, based in part on the evidence ob-
tained, was returned against the defendant charging him with arson.
Before trial the defendant filed a motion to suppress testimony of the
investigators. Defendant contended that the testimony and evidence of
investigators was gained without benefit of a search warrant and there-
fore was inadmissible. In a five to four decision, the Iowa court held, in
State v. Rees,' that no showing was made that the search violated defend-
ants constitutional rights. That a statutory investigation uncovers evidence
that a crime has been committed does not prevent furher investigation
without a search warrant; such further search does not become constitu-
tionally unreasonable nor the evidence obtained thereby inadmissible in a
criminal prosecution growing out of this investigation. Justice Rawlings,
in a vigorous dissent said:
In effect the majority opinion holds that when peace
officers, administrative agents, or others are in a place
where they have a lawful right to be for conduct of a
civil investigation they are, by the same token in a
place where they have a lawful right to be for a search
and seizure. This cannot be.3
12 Stedman, The U.S. Patent System and Its Current Problems, 42 TnXAs L
REv. 450, 492 (1964).
'IOWA CODE ANN. ch. 100, §§ 100.1-3, 100.9.10, 100.12 (1962).
2 139 N.W. 2d 406 (Iowa 1966).
3Id. at 419. (All italicized in original.)
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Under common law a search and seizure might be unreasonable for
two reasons: (1) because it was made without a warrant or the warrant
used was defective; (2) the purpose of the search was to secure material
not amenable to search or seizure even with a warrant.4 Today under
statutory authority private premises are subject to inspection for various
reasons without a warrant. The constitutionality of such statutes has been
tested several times recently and each time, such statutes have been held
constitutional with one exception.5 The contestants usually challenge these
statutes on the grounds that they violate their rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments6 of the United States Constitution. In the fol-
lowing cases the validity of state statutes permitting public officers to
inspect private premises without a warrant will be considered. Although
these cases do not deal with criminal prosecutions arising from civil in-
spections, they do find that such inspections are unreasonable if they are
made to secure evidence of a criminal nature. The owner or occupant of
the premises in each case refused to allow inspectors to enter the premises
and conduct their inspections without a warrant.
In Griviner v. State,7 the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld a Bald-
more ordinance s which authorized health, fire, and building inspectors to
conduct inspections to determine if premises met requirements of appli-
cable regulations and prescribed a fine if the owner or occupier refused
to allow inspection. The court said: 'There is no suggestion that any of
the inspection was to be used as a cover to conduct a search for any vio-
lation of the criminal law."
9
The Missouri Supreme Court, in City of St. Louis v. Evans,10 held that
an ordinance, which authorized the building commissioner to enter any
structure in performance of his duty and, if refused, to secure the aid of
the police did not violate the privileges and immunities, equal protection,
or due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. It was pointed out in this case that the purpose of the in-
spection did not involve a criminal charge, but was only to see if there
had been a violation of the ordinance.
4 See 4 SELECrED EsSAYS ON CONSTITUnONAL LAw 626 (1938).5 District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), af'd on other
grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950). This was the first case to consider whether an in-
spection of a private home without a warrant was a violation of the fourth amend-
ment. The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the trial court by the appeals
court; however, the Court affirmed on the grounds that the defendant had not
interferred with the inspector under the purview of the act and thereby avoided
the question of the act's constitutionality.% The fourth amendment secures the people inter alia against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The fourteenth amendment provides that no state may enforce
laws which abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United
States.
7210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956).8 BALTIMORE, ID., CrTY CODE art 12, § 120 (1950).
9 Giviner v. State, supra note 7 at ........ , 124 A2d at 774.
10 337 S.W.2d 948 (Mo. 1960).
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The most recent case in Camara v. Municipal Court,1 which held a
San Francisco housing code which authorized employees of city agencies
to conduct inspections at reasonable times to be valid; it being a part of
a regulatory scheme which was essentially civil rather than criminal in
nature, limited in scope and not to be exercised unreasonably.
The leading case is Frank v. Maryland,'2 where the defendant refused
to allow a health inspector to enter his home without a warrant and was
fined for his refusal. The Court held the fine for the refusal to allow in-
spection where there was probable cause was not in violation of either
the fourth or fourteenth amendments. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who took
special notice that no evidence for criminal prosecution was sought to be
seized, said: 'Evidence of criminal action may not, save in very limited and
closely confined situations, be seized without a judically issued search
warrant.""3 Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the four dissenters, felt that
any entrance upon private property without a warrant was unreasonable
and fourth amendment protections should not be limited to searches for
criminal evidence.14
In Ohio ex. rel. Eaton v. Price'5 the same question was presented, but
the issue remained unresolved because of a four to four vote.16 In light
of the cases it would appear that the better rule of law, as to statutory
authority to search private premises without a warrant, is: Reasonable
searches under statutory authority, for the protection of public health,
safety and welfare are not in violation of fourth amendment protection;
however, criminal evidence may not be seized under color of such statutes
and evidence so secured will be inadmissible in later criminal prosecu-
tions.
This rule was followed in a recent New York case, People v. Laverne,17
where an inspector entered defendant's dwelling under authority of a
building zone ordinance,' 8 which provided that a violation of its provi-
sions was disorderly conduct and assessed a penalty. The defendant's
11237 Cal. App. 2d 136, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
12 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
13Id. at 365 (Emphasis added.)14 Mr. Justice Douglas said "Fear of trespassing on Fourth Amendment rights
was expressly made the grounds for a narrow reading of statutory powers in
Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 ... The 'fishing
expeditions' there condemned . . . led no more directly to possible criminal
prosecutions than the knock on the door in the present case." Id. at 375-376.
15 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
1'Mr. Justice Stewart disqualified himself from sitting on the case since his
father had participated, as a member of the Ohio Supreme Court, in the decision
in State ex rel. v. Price.
17 14 N.Y.2d 304, 200 N.E.2d 441, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1964).1 8 
"It shall be the duty of the Building Inspector and he is hereby given au-
thority, to enforce the provisions of this ordinance. The Building Inspector in
the discharge of his duties shall have authority to enter any building or premiws
at any reasonable hour." VILLAGE OF LAUREL HOLLOW, N.Y., BUILDING ZONE
ORDiNANcE art. 10, § 10.1 (1961).
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building was inspected for evidence of violation of the ordinance. These
investigations later became the basis of criminal prosecutions against the
defendant for violation of the ordinance which made it a criminal offense
to conduct a business in a non-business zone. The majority opinion
pointed out that the search here did not lead to a civil proceeding to pro-
tect the public health and welfare, but lead instead to an official search
without a warrant on which criminal prosecutions were based. The court
found that the searches were repugnant to constitutional protections and
reversed his conviction.
The Oklahoma Fire Marshall Statute'9 grants the fire marshall and his
assistants basically the same authority to investigate the origins and causes
of fires as does the Iowa statute.20 Oklahoma has yet to rule on the ad-
missability in criminal prosecutions of evidence secured under statutory
authority without a search warrant. However, the Supreme Court of Okla-
homa has ruled on the question of inspection of private premises without
a search warrant under statutory authority. Here, as in Frank, no criminal
prosecution was intended as a result.
In Jack's Supper Club Ltd. v. City of Norman2l the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court held that a Norman city ordinance,2 2 providing that the
premises of private dubs where intoxicating liquors might be consumed
may be inspected by a city officer, was not void as contrary to the fourth
amendment guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures. The plaintiff
objected to the provision in the ordinance which permitted premises to be
searched without a search warrant. The majority opinion said:
It should be kept in mind that in passing the ordi-
nance complained of the City of Norman is undertak-
ing to regulate the operation of private dubs ... all
under its police power to preserve the peace and wel-
fare of the community. The United States Constitution
contains a . . . prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures, but such prohibitions are not
absolute, and it is only unreasonable searches which are
are prohibited. 25
This case is in accord with the Frank, Giviner, Camara, and City of St.
Louis cases.
If a case similar to Rees was to come before the Oklahoma courts, the
courts would probably follow the Laverne rather than the Rees case and
hold that a search such as conducted by the Iowa officials in Rees would
be considered unreasonable, the search not being for the protection of
community peace and welfare. Rees appears to be contrary to current legal
19 OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, §§ 314 (1961).2 0 IowA CODE ANN. ch. 100, §§ 100.1-3, 100.9.10, 100.12 (1962).
21361 P.2d 291 (Okla. 1961).
22 NoRMAN, OKLA,, Ordinance No. 1165 § 13.23 Jackes Supper Club Ltd. v. City of Norman, supra note 21, at 295-96.
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